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ANDREW P. VANCE MEMORIAL
WRITING COMPETITION WINNERS
CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE:
HOW NAFTA AND GATT
HAVE REDUCED PROTECTION FOR
GEOGRAPHICAL TRADEMARKS
John R. Renaud*
"If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we
purchase goods by them."
Justice Felix Frankfurter
I. INTRODUCTION
As economic forces transcend national boundaries, the role
of international trademark law becomes increasingly important
to companies doing business abroad. The extent of the value
associated with brand name recognition is evidenced by the
large amounts of money spent each year in advertising and
enforcing trademark rights. The high costs and risks associat-
ed with introducing new brand names into the marketplace,
along with the enormous profit potential for companies that
can create global name recognition, has focused interest on the
effectiveness and predictability of trademark laws around the
world.' This interest has resulted in an increased effort to
harmonize trademark laws within broader multilateral trading
systems.2
* Associate, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; A.L.B. 1992, Harvard
University; J.D. 2000, Emory University School of Law.
1. See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNATL L. 689 (1989); Eleanor K. Meltzer, TRIPS and Trademarks, or
GATT Got Your Tongue?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 18 (1993).
2. See Adrian Otten & Hannu Wagner, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerg-
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The problems with harmonization are varied and complex.
This article considers only geographical trademarks-those
which have a geographical term, phrase, or emblem included
within them, such as the trademark CALIFORNIA COOLER3
and investigates how the recent multilateral intellectual prop-
erty treaties have influenced the law in this area. The article
will focus on a particular type of geographical trademark called
the "geographically misdescriptive" trademark, which utilizes,
or suggests, an inaccurate geographical term. An example of
such a mark is CALIFORNIA MIX for mixed nuts not from
California.4 The laws affecting this class of trademarks have
been dramatically altered in recent years as a result of con-
flicts between common law and civil law trademark doctrines.
In considering these developments, this article will reveal
how the doctrines addressing geographical marks have been
altered by compromise in an effort to harmonize trademark
law. More specifically, it is submitted that the effort to compro-
mise on language preventing misleading geographical marks
unfortunately has resulted in prohibiting trademarks that are
not apt to mislead anyone. As a solution, the article recom-
mends that (1) domestic courts should adopt the higher "noted
for" standard for determining whether a mark is considered
geographically misdescriptive, rather than the lesser "asso-
ciation" standard most courts employ; and, (2) that
GATT/TRIPS be amended to include a provision which makes
clear the narrow limits of its commands. Such an amendment
will prevent the developing countries that have yet to comply
with GATT/TRIPS from legislating away trademark rights that
the agreement does not seek to abolish.
II. THE TREATMENT OF GEOGRAPHICAL MARKS
To demonstrate the recent domestic changes that have
occurred as a result of efforts to comply with multilateral intel-
lectual property treaties, the logical starting point is the
Lanham Act,5 as it existed before the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented in 1993.6 Section
ing World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 393 (1996).
. 3. See California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.
1985).
4. See In re Midwest Nut & Seed Co., 214 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1245 (1991).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
6. NAFTA Implementation Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-361(I), at 8 (1993), reprint.
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1052 (e)(2) of the Lanham Act divided geographical marks into
two categories "primarily geographically descriptive" and "pri-
marily deceptively misdescriptive," yet it treated both marks in
the same way.7 Congress also created a third category in sec-
tion 1052(a), labeled "deceptive," which can apply to any type
of trademark, but often becomes relevant when a geographical
mark is at issue.8 As will be shown, this duplicate use of the
word "deceptive" has caused confusion by mixing the concept of
distinctiveness with the concept of deceptiveness. This confu-
sion inadvertently has created holes in trademark protection
under the Lanham Act. The following sections analyze the case
law interpreting the categories created by the Lanham Act,
which will help explain the reason why benign geographically
misdescriptive trademarks have become endangered.
A. Primarily Geographically Descriptive Marks
The first step in assessing a geographical mark under the
old regime (the pre-NAFTA Lanham Act) was to determine if it
was primarily geographically descriptive.9 If the geographic
meaning of the mark was "minor, obscure, remote or uncon-
nected with the goods," then the mark would not be deemed
primarily geographical, but rather arbitrary, and thus suffi-
ciently distinctive to be legally protected. 9 Also, if a well-
known geographic term had other connotations "such that the
term's geographical significance may not be the primary signif-
icance to prospective purchasers," then the trademark would
ed in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552.
7. "No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on
account of its nature unless it:
(e) Consists of a mark which,...
(2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant
is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive
of them...
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a) - (d) of this section,
nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by
the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) (emphasis added).
8. See Id. § 1052(a).
9. See Id. § 1052(e)(2).
10. See In re Brauerei Aying Franz Inselkammer KG, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73,
75 (1983).
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not be primarily geographical." The drafters of the Lanham
Act used the term "primarily" to avoid having the trademark
examiner look up the term in an atlas and refuse registration
if there were any place on Earth using it, as was the prior
practice under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.12 This older prac-
tice led to unfortunate results: AVON for perfume was rejected
because of the river in England, 13 and KEM for playing cards
was rejected due to the river in Russia." The Lanham Act
abolished this approach. For example, in V&V Food Products,
Inc. v. Cacique Cheese Co., 5 the court found that the plaintiff
failed to show the trademark CHIHUAHUA for cheese prod-
ucts was primarily geographical. 6
If a term is determined to be primarily geographically
descriptive, then it is treated like other "merely descriptive"
marks. Merely descriptive marks are not given immediate
protection because they do not distinguish their producer from
other producers. 7 In Canal Co. v. Clark, the Supreme Court
decided that geographical indications alone are not distinctive
enough to be protected as trademarks because they "point only
at the place of production, not to the producer."" However,
this obstacle can be overcome with a showing of acquired dis-
tinctiveness. 9 The Lanham Act provides that "nothing in this
chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the
11. See In re Handler Fenton Westerns, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 848, 850
(1982).
12. See J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
14:27 (2000). The 1905 Act prohibited "merely a geographical name or term" from
becoming registered. 15 U.S.C. § 85(b) (1905), reprinted in DAPHNE ROBERT, THE
NEW TRADEMARK MANUAL 274 (1947).
13. See In re California Perfume Co., 56 F.2d 885 (C.C.P.A. 1932).
14. See Ex parte Kem Card Sales Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 354 (Comm'r Pats.
1938).
15. See 683 F. Supp. 662, 670 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
16. See id. The court expected witnesses, surveys, or encyclopedia references
showing that the relevant public understood the term as a geographical one. See
also Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 1994), where the
Court held that SWISS ARMY KNIFE is not primarily geographically descriptive
when used on knives (made in China) because it is not the same thing as the
designation "made in Switzerland." The court explained that simply because a
term evokes geographic associations does not automatically compel a conclusion
that the mark is primarily geographically descriptive. Id.
17. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 11:23.
18. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1872): See also McCarthy, supra note 12,
§ 14:1.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994).
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applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce.""0 To establish acquired distinctiveness, often
called "secondary meaning," the owner must show that because
of widespread use, the mark identifies the owner as the source
of the product.2' Once secondary meaning is established the
courts generally provide a geographical mark the same protec-
tion as other distinctive marks.2
B. Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks
The geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark utiliz-
es a geographical term that does not describe the place where
the goods or services originate. This is the class of trademarks
that is endangered by the effort to harmonize trademark law
through multilateral treaties. An example of this type of mark
is SHEFFIELD for stoves not originating in Sheffield, Eng-
land. One might ask why anyone would be interested in
maintaining protection for marks that contain some degree of
misinformation. The reason is that despite the connotation of
the term "deceptively misdescriptive," these marks are not
likely to cause consumers to purchase goods due to false label-
ing. The inaccuracies are by definition not a substantial factor
in the consumer's decision to purchase.
With deceptively misdescriptive marks, much turns on
whether the court finds there is an association between the
goods and the place that the mark suggests. If the court finds
20. Id. Secondary meaning is a question of fact and is often shown in court
through surveys, evidence of advertising, and evidence of the amount of sales of a
product using the descriptive term.
21. See Boston Beer Co. v. Sleslar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175 (1st Cir.
1993). The courts generally look to the length of time the mark is used, the
amount spent on advertising, and the results of consumer surveys to determine
secondary meaning. Five years of exclusive and continuous use in commerce cre-
ates prima facie evidence of secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0. The Court in
New Yorker Hotel Corp. v. Pusateri, 87 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Mo. 1949), found that
the famous New Yorker Hotel in New York City gained secondary meaning
through its extensive, nationwide publicity and advertising campaign conducted
over a long period of time, thus giving the owner the exclusive right to use the
name in the operation of hotels; even against a junior user in Kansas City, Mis-
souri. Id.
22. See Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857
(5th Cir. 1967).
23. See Master v. Cribben & Sexton Co., 202 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
24. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 14:7.
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there is a goods/place association, and the goods are not from
the place, then the term is deemed deceptively misdescriptive.
If there is no goods/place association, then the mark is consid-
ered arbitrary.' Under section 1052(e) of the pre-NAFTA
Lanham Act, a geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark
was registrable only with a showing of secondary meaning,
while an arbitrary mark, which was considered inherently
distinctive, was immediately registrable.26 The court in In re
Nantucket, Inc.27 used the following hypothetical to clarify the
goods/place association requirement: "[r]easonable persons are
unlikely to believe that bananas labeled ALASKA originated or
were grown in Alaska. On the other hand, reasonable persons
are quite likely to believe that salmon labeled ALASKA origi-
nated in the waters of that state."8
However, in finding a goods/place association the courts
have not required that the place be "noted for" the production
of the goods, as the Nantucket court's example of ALASKA
salmon might imply. The court in Burke-Parsons-Bowbly Corp.
v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc.29 held that the district court
properly found a goods/place association between APPALA-
CHIAN and log homes "regardless of whether the area was
noted for the production of those goods."0 The intensity of the
association required by the court to support a finding of
misdescriptiveness is difficult to predict, yet it is determinative
in these cases.3 '
In The Institut National Des Appellations D'Origine v.
Vinters International Co., Inc.,32 the court considered whether
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) decision to
dismiss with prejudice an opposition filed by the French orga-
nization was proper." The issue was whether the mark CHA-
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
28. Id. at 97, n.5.
29. 871 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1989).
30. Id. at 594.
31. Examples of marks held deceptively misdescriptive under the pre-NAFTA
Lanham Act include: MANHATTAN for cookies (In re Cookie Kitchen, Inc., 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 873 (1986)); NEW ENGLAND for baked goods (In re Pan -0- Gold
Baking Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791 (1991)); AMERICAN BEAUTY for a sewing
machine (Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d 273 (C.C.P.A. 1963)).
32. 958 F.2d 1574 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
33. Id.
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BLIS WITH A TWIST for a citrus flavored wine not from the
Chablis region of France was deceptively misdescriptive 4
The court held that although the Institute established that in
France CHABLIS is a designation lawfully used only for wines
from the Chablis region, it is not enough to deny the mark a
registration in the United States.35 The court held that the
Institute failed to establish that the relevant American con-
sumers of these wine products would perceive the term CHA-
BLIS as indicating that the product came from this particular
region, thus the mark was held to be distinctive.36 The Vinters
decision was unpopular abroad, but it was consistent with the
spirit of the Lanham Act in that it protected the mark because
it was likely to function as a trademark, and was not apt to
mislead the consuming public. Unfortunately, the law has
moved away from this approach.
C. Deceptive Marks
All marks that were deemed deceptive to the public were,
and still are, barred from federal registration under section
1052(a) of the Lanham Act."7 Such a determination was "more
damning" than being held deceptively misdescriptive under
section 1052(e), because it could not be cured by showing sec-
ondary meaning.3' The original test for finding a mark decep-
tive looked to whether the applicant planned to deceive the
public into believing the product had a greater quality or sal-
ability than it actually possessed. 9 Such wrongful intent was
inferred when the place-name adopted was well known for the
particular items.4" Under the modern approach, a mark is
34. See id. The court decided the issue on this reasoning, but it seems that
the issue of genericism also is at work here.
35. See id. at 1580.
36. See id. See also In re Societe Generale Des Eaux Minerales de Vittel,
S.A., 824 F.2d 957 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994). This section also bars immoral, scandalous
marks; marks which disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, insti-
tutions, or national symbols; marks using the name, portrait, or signature of de-
ceased Presidents during the life of his widow; marks comprised of the flag or
coat of arms; and marks which are likely to cause confusion with a mark already
registered. Id.
38. See W. D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
313 (T.T.A.B. 1965), affd. 377 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1967).
39. See In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
40. Id.
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held deceptive if it is "material" to the decision to purchase the
goods; "material" meaning that the consumer is influenced to
purchase because of the misdescription. 4' Any type of trade-
mark can be held deceptive under section 1052(a); the section
does not single out geographical marks for specialized treat-
ment. However, the section is likely to be implicated when a
geographic mark is not accurate. For example, in Bureau Na-
tional Interprofessionel Du Cognac v. International Better
Drinks Corp.,42 the TTAB considered whether the use of the
term COLOGNAC for a cola-flavored liqueur produced and
bottled in Spain was a geographically deceptive mark.43 The
Court concluded that there could be "no doubt" that this decep-
tion would be material to the purchasing decision of consumers
because of the renown of "COGNAC" brandy, and therefore the
mark was deemed deceptive."
An analysis of the differences between "deceptively misde-
scriptive" and "deceptive" as they were treated under the pre-
NAFTA Lanham Act will help one to appreciate the error Con-
gress made when the Act was amended in 1993. Unlike "decep-
tive misdescription" under section 1052(e), which is concerned
with whether a geographical mark is distinctive, "deception"
under section 1052(a) protects against fraud. The distinctive
requirement primarily serves the interests of third party com-
petitors who want to enter the senior trademark user's market.
The Lanham Act requires that trademarks be distinctive be-
cause of the undesirability of preventing junior users from
41. The "materiality test" was first suggested in Kenneth B. Germain, Trade-
mark Registration under sections 2(a) and 2(e) of the Lanham Act: The Deception
Decision, 44 FORDHAMI L. REV. 249 (1975), and was first employed by the Trade-
mark Board in In re Winsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (finding
that BAHIA was deceptive for cigars because consumers would rely on the misrep-
resentation because cigars are the principal product of the Brazilian province).
42. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610 (1988).
43. Id.
44. Id. Other examples of marks found to be deceptive under 15 U.S.C. §
1052(a) are: In re Phillips Van Heusen Corp., 1996 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 400 (1996)
(finding MILANO UOMO for shirts not from Milan Italy deceptive); In re Juleigh
Jeans Sportswear, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1694 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (finding the
term LONDON for sportswear not from London, England deceptive); In re Biesseci
S.P.A, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (finding the term AMERICAN
SYSTEM for clothing made in Italy deceptive); In re Perry Mfg. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1751 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (finding the term PERRY NEW YORK with logo show-
ing an urban skyline was deceptive for clothing made in North Carolina).
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describing their products to consumers.45 As one judge recent-
ly stated, "the primary cost of recognizing property rights in
trademarks is the removal of words from (or perhaps non-en-
trance into) our language."46 In contrast, the rule against de-
ception directly protects the consumer. The two concepts are
complimentary, but should not be confused. The "materiality"
test imposes a higher standard on the trademark examiner
attempting to deny registration, than does the goods/place test:
"deception is not present where a... trademark may involve a
degree of untruth but the deception may be perfectly innocent,
harmless or negligible."47 This scheme made sense because a
more compelling showing of potential deception should be re-
quired before property rights are permanently extinguished: A
deceptively misdescriptive mark, considered less harmful,
could be cured by showing secondary meaning, while a mark
declared deceptive never can be cured.48
By pairing accurate geographical terms with inaccurate
geographical terms in section 1052(e), and treating them the
same way, the drafters of the Lanham Act were concerned
with distinctiveness and not deception.49 However, due to an
unfortunate choice of language, the two have been confused. It
is unlikely that the drafters were targeting the evils of mis-
leading information when composing section 1052(e) because
there were other clauses in the Act that focused more directly
on eradicating deception. As discussed above, section 1052(a)
unequivocally bars deceptive marks at the registration stage.
For deception occurring from unregistered marks, trade dress,
and advertising, section 1125(a) allows a party likely to be
damaged by "any false designation of origin," or any "false or
misleading representation of fact" to sue for civil damages. 0
With these two sections in place, it is redundant and illogical
45. See Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
46. New Kids on the Block v. New Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305, n.2
(9th Cir. 1992).
47. In re Sweden Freezer Mfg. Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994).
49. See Daphne Leeds, Trademark - The Rationale of Registrability, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 663 (1958). Long before the NAFTA treaty, the Assistant Commis-
sioner of Patents in Charge of Trademarks, Daphne Leeds, explained that the
primarily geographically descriptive provision and the deceptively misdescriptive
provision "are so analogous that the interpretations are likely to be the same." Id.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
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to include within a clause that speaks to the issue of distinc-
tiveness, yet another clause aimed at deception.
The distinction between the purposes of section 1052(a)
and section 1052(e) is further highlighted by the fact that ar-
guments based on the respective clauses were subject to differ-
ent time restraints. A mark that was allegedly geographically
deceptively misdescriptive could be challenged by third parties
only up to five years after the registration date.5' After this
period the mark was deemed "incontestable."52 By contrast,
deceptive marks under section 1052(a) could never become
incontestable," since allowing this status would obviously
work a fraud on the public. Likewise, a misleading mark under
section 1125 cannot be cured through the passage of time. 4
The different treatment the Lanham Act afforded these marks
demonstrates that the injuries thought to flow from protecting
the occasional misdescriptive mark, which had not distin-
guished itself through use in commerce, were not as acute as
deceptive marks, and could be tolerated in the interest of pro-
viding security to the trademark owner. It also compels the
conclusion that the deceptively misdescriptive clause was not
intended to address the problem of consumer deception.
A more plausible explanation of the language is that the
drafters55 wanted to prevent lawyers from being able to argue
successfully that a misdescriptive geographical mark was not
"descriptive" because the goods did not come from the place
described.56 The drafters did not want such marks to be so
easily registered because, like accurate geographical descrip-
tions, they do not sufficiently distinguish the goods. The cumu-
51. See id. §§ 1064-65.
52. See id.
53. See id. § 1064(3).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
55. The Lanham Act's legislative history "provides no clarification" on the sub-
stance of the differences between the two sections. Germain, supra note 41, at
250. See also S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 276, 281
(Comm'r Pats. 1959).
56. This argument was employed in attempts to avoid being deemed misde-
scriptive in other context under the Trade Mark Act of 1905. In In re Bonide
Chemical Co., 46 F.2d 705 (C.C.P.A. 1931), a federal court first considered the
issue of whether an inaccurately descriptive mark could be registered. The appli-
cant argued that CROW-TOX was not descriptive when used on a bird repellent
for seeds because the goods contained no poison. Id. at 707. The court rejected the
argument, but coined the term "misdescriptive." Id. See also In re International
Resistance Co., 69 F.2d 567 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
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lative effect of allowing merely descriptive marks, even when
inaccurate, would be to deplete the language and hence stifle
competition, so the drafters most likely added the term "misde-
scriptive" to prevent this.57 However, the drafters could not
use "misdescriptive" alone because arbitrary uses of geograph-
ical terms are also "misdescriptive" and such marks were suffi-
ciently distinctive to protect. Employing "misdescriptive" alone
might have resulted in the same absurd decisions that oc-
curred under the 1905 Act, where the examining attorney at
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) looked the term up in
an atlas and checked for its accuracy." The drafters most
likely wanted to create essentially two categories ofisdescriptiveness: one type that was arbitrary and immedi-
ately capable of being registered, and another which was not
arbitrary, and that required secondary meaning to be suffi-
ciently distinctive.
Ironically, it was not the courts, but Congress itself, which
misapprehended the dual purposes of section 1052 many years
after the Lanham Act was passed. The courts, despite the
confusing rhetoric that one would expect when dealing with
two different types of "deception," actually employed the
scheme in its intended manner. Interpreting the phrase "pri-
marily geographically deceptively misdescriptive," the courts
developed the goods/place association to distinguish between
geographically arbitrary and deceptively misdescriptive marks.
When a mark was found to be deceptively misdescriptive, it
simply was treated like merely descriptive marks. Unfortu-
nately, by confusing the issue of distinctiveness (§1052(e)) with
the issue of deception (§1052(a)), Congress erroneously per-
ceived a conflict between NAFTA and the Lanham Act, and
shut the door on a whole class of trademark owners. The next
section addresses why it was unnecessary to amend the
Lanham Act to comply with NAFTA.
57. The drafters probably adopted the term from the judiciary, and thus un-
derstood its meaning in the context of a distinctiveness dispute. See In re Bonide
Chemical Co., 46 F.2d at 707.
58. In re California Perfume Co., 56 F.2d 885 (C.C.P.A. 1932). As previously
explained, the drafters attempted to rid this practice by using the term "primari-
ly," but an unqualified use of the term "misdescriptive" could yield similar results
in the misdescriptive context when interpreted in a strictly literal manner.
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III. MULTILATERAL TRADEMARK TREATIES AND THEIR
INFLUENCE ON THE LANHAM ACT
There are a multitude of global and regional treaties relat-
ing to trademarks and unfair trade practices, and there is
considerable overlap in what rights these agreements create
and the means by which they protect them.59 A comprehen-
sive discussion of all these treaties would go beyond the scope
of this paper, and is not necessary to demonstrate the general
effect such treaties have had on trademark law. Accordingly,
just two multilateral treaties will be considered here, NAFTA
and GATT/TRIPS.
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA was the first treaty in recent history to have a
significant influence on the United States' substantive doc-
trines regarding geographical indications; it was signed on
December 17, 1992, by the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
and entered into force on January 1, 1994.60 The purpose of
NAFTA was to create a tariff-free trade zone between the
three countries."' To encourage vigorous trade among the par-
ties, the Agreement also sought to eliminate non-tariff barri-
ers, such as comprehensive intellectual property protection.
As part of this protection, NAFTA required the signatories to
deny trademark protection to marks that are geographically
misleading to the public. The relevant language is as follows:
1. Each Party shall provide, in respect of geographical indica-
tions, the legal means for interested persons to prevent:
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presenta-
tion of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in
question originates in a territory, region or locality other
than the true place of origin, in a manner that misleads
59. For a detailed overview of what countries have signed what treaties, see
generally Global Trademark and Copyright, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights
in the International Marketplace, in MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF APPLICATIONS
FOR PATENTS, DEsIGNs AND TRADE MARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Manual In-
dustrial Property 2000) [hereinafter Global Trademark and Copyright].
60. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 605, 698 [hereinafter NAFTA].
61. NAFTA Implementation Act, H.R. REP. NO. 103-361(I) (1993).
62. Id.
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the public as to the geographical origin of the
good ... 63
Congress, in its rushed attempt to comply with NAFTA
within the allotted time frame, determined that section 1052(e)
of the Lanham Act conflicted with this language. The treaty
requires signatory countries to give a legal remedy to interest-
ed parties to prevent geographical indications that mislead the
public, while the Lanham Act protected marks which were
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive." This
misdescriptive quality was perceived to be "misleading," so
Congress amended the Lanham Act so these marks could no
longer be registered.' This was done in the form of omitting
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks from the pro-
vision affording merely descriptive marks protection, if they
obtained secondary meaning.65
As a result, the mark TEXAS STEAKHOUSE & SALOON
for a restaurant chain not based in Texas was denied registra-
tion under the amended Lanham Act.66 Under the pre-NAFTA
Lanham Act, the mark almost certainly would have been
deemed "misdescriptive" and been afforded the opportunity to
63. See NAFTA, supra note 60, art. 1712 [emphasis added]. The Treaty also
applies to geographical indications which are misleading, but accurately describe
the origin of the goods or services: "Each Party shall also apply paragraphs 1 and
2 to a geographical indication that although correctly indicating the territory, re-
gion or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represents the public that the
goods originate in another territory, region or locality." Id. art. 1712, para. 3 (em-
phasis added). This language would apply to situations where, for example, RO-
MAN INTERIORS were sold by a company based out of Rome, Georgia. Such a
sweeping prohibition on such terms is surprising, since all NAFTA countries have
adopted many geographical names from well known European centers of commerce.
64. NAFTA Implementation Act, Subtitle C - Intellectual Property, Pub. L. No.
103-182, § 333, 107 Stat. 2114 (1993).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994). The language of § 1052(e) was changed to
create a separate category for deceptively misdescriptive marks-(e)(3)--to which §
1052(f) does not apply.
66. See In re Texas Steakhouse of Roanoke, Inc., 1997 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 162
(1997). See also Fred Hayman Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Jacques Bernier, Inc., 38
U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) (1996) (denying registration for RODEO DRIVE for perfume not
designed or sold on Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills, California); In re Mitchell E.
Peck, 1998 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 470 (1998) (denying MEXICAN WATER for bottled
drinking water); In re Brenda French, 1996 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 70 (1996) (denying
FRENCH RAGS for sweaters and scarves); In re Les Boulangers Assocs., Inc.,
1998 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 391 (1998) (denying PARIS SNACKS for ready to eat
breadsticks).
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develop protectable trademark rights through use in com-
merce.67 If the mark acquired distinctiveness through com-
mercial use, then it would have been qualified for federal regis-
tration. Instead, the applicant, who had been using the mark
in commerce for almost five years,68 was denied registration,
even though it is highly unlikely that any customer would be
wronged by the name.69 This change in the Lanham Act shift-
ed the issue of registering geographical marks from whether
the misdescriptive quality of the geographical mark would be
material to the consumer's decision to purchase the product, to
the lesser standard of whether there is a goods/place associa-
tion for the mark.7 ° If the Examiner finds that there is such
an association, and the mark is geographically inaccurate, then
the mark is barred for being deceptively misdescriptive.7
The Amendments to the Lanham Act go beyond the re-
quirements of the NAFTA treaty, and reveal Congress's inat-
tention to the proper scope of the deceptively misdescriptive
clause in section 1052(e). Congress seized on the term "decep-
tively" as if it operated in a vacuum without properly consid-
ering the structure of the Act. In its report on NAFTA's intel-
lectual property provisions, the Committee on the Judiciary
simply concluded that section 1052(e) of the Lanham Act had
to be amended: "[p]aragraphs two and three of [NAFTA] Arti-
cle 1712 require NAFTA governments to refuse to register
marks that are deceptively misdescriptive in respect of geo-
graphical origin regardless of whether the mark has acquired
distinctiveness."72 The rationale underlying the Committee's
conclusion unravels upon close examination. First, the treaty
does not state explicitly that geographically deceptively misde-
scriptive marks shall not be registrable, and there is no lan-
guage which suggests that the treaty specifically targeted sec-
tion 1052(e). Secondly, the pre-NAFTA Lanham Act did not
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994). This provision allows registration of marks "capa-
ble of distinguishing the applicant's goods and services."
68. See In re Texas Steakhouse of Roanoke, Inc., 1997 T.T.A.B. LEXIS at 162
n.1. If the applicant was not the first to file, the issue of misdescriptiveness would
be moot. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1994).
69. The applicant presented evidence that its customers did not believe that
the food, nor the food service came from Texas. In re Texas Steakhouse, 1997
T.T.A.B. LEXIS at 162 n.8.
70. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 14:31.
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) (1994).
72. S. REP. No. 103-189, at 267 (1993).
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allow registration of distinctive, yet misleading trademarks; it
unequivocally barred such marks under section 1052(a). Yet
the pre-NAFTA Lanham Act allowed deceptively misdescrip-
tive marks. Hence, it was faulty statutory interpretation to
conclude that the two types of marks were afforded the same
legal treatment.73 Deceptively misdescriptive marks under
section 1052(e) are by definition not misleading because they
are not likely to induce a purchase based on faulty informa-
tion.74 Both the language and the structure of the Lanham
Act strongly suggest that section 1052(a) and section 1052(e)
are mutually exclusive categories of trademarks.75
Finally, despite the Committee's ipse dixit, the language of
the treaty and the practice under the Lanham Act are consis-
tent with each other. The terms "misleading" and "deceptive"
both seek to combat the same evil, and both mean essentially
the same thing in our language. 6 The courts have developed
a test for what is deceptive (or misleading) that requires the
inaccuracies to be a motivating factor in the decision to pur-
chase.77 This requirement is sound because property rights
should not be cast aside if there is no possibility for consumers
to actually be injured.7" Such an approach is probably a neces-
73. See Germain, supra note 41. "If the scope of the meaning of the word
'deceptively misdescriptive' recited in paragraph (e) is precisely the same as or
contained entirely within the scope of the meaning of the word 'deceptive' recited
in paragraph (a), then the addition of the words to paragraph (e), particularly in
view of the presence of paragraph (f), could only be taken as a wholly meaningless
act." Id. at 257.
74. See Sweden Freezer, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 249.
75. See W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
313, 318 (T.TA.B. 1965). "[S]ince deceptive marks are precluded by section 2(a) of
the Statute and deceptively misdescriptive marks by Section 2(e)(1), it is logical to
assume that the framers of the Statute intented them to be mutually exclusive."
Id.
76. Deception is defined as the act of deceiving; intentional misleading by
falsehood spoken or acted. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 406 (6th ed. 1990). Mis-
leading is defined as delusive; calculated to lead astray or to lead to error. Id. at
1000. It could be argued that based on this definition, to be misleading, there
must be the likelihood that an actual error could be made based on the misinfor-
mation.
77. See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.C. 1955), affd sub nom.
S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
78. See Germain, supra note 41, at 266. "If purchasers do not rely on the
term and are not influenced by it, then they are neither mislead [sic] nor de-
ceived." Id. (quoting the Patent Office's Trademark Manual of Examining Proce-
dure § 1208.06).
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sity in a world full of media-hype, puffery,79 and other harm-
less forms of distorted information.0 Nothing in the clear lan-
guage of NAFTA requires the United States to discard this
common sense doctrine.8'
The Committee should have harmonized the treaty with
established law by reasoning that the term "misleads the pub-
lic" requires that consumers care enough about the geographic
origin of the good that they actually rely on it when purchas-
ing. The inclusion of the term "public" in NAFTA lends itself to
this interpretation. Historically, civil law countries have nego-
tiated against using the term in ffiany prior multilateral trea-
ties addressing the subject. For example, both the Lisbon
Agreement and the Madrid Agreement prohibit geographical
misdescription without any reference to public perception,
which is part of the reason the United States is not a party to
either." Thus, the reference to public perception in NAFTA
79. See, e.g., Nikkal Indust., Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1227, 1235 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that mere puffing is not actionable as false advertising
under § 1125 of the Lanham Act).
80. Consumer protection statutes aimed at deceptive sales practices also re-
quire that the alleged deception reasonably could be found to have caused a con-
sumer to act differently than he or she would have otherwise. See Kazmaier v.
Wooten, 761 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985).
81. At least two examining attorneys at the PTO did not think there was a
conflict between NAFTA and the Lanham Act when interviewed in late 1994. See
Elke Elizabeth Werner, Comment, Are We Trading Our Lanham Act Away? An
Evaluation of Conflicting Provisions Between the NAFTA and North American
Trademark Law, 2 SW. J. L. & TRADE Am. 227 n.14 (1995). The United States
was not alone in adopting a more rigorous standard for determining what consti-
tutes deceptiveness. The Dutch courts have found that RICHMOND for cigarettes
and JOLI PARIS for women's stockings were not misleading to their consuming
population. L. Wichers Hoeth, Protection of Geographic Denominations in the Neth-
erlands, in PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHIC DENOMINATIONS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
75, 78 (Herman Cohen Jehoram ed. 1980). Likewise, the Swiss allow registration
of geographical marks if "it is thought by the judges that most consumers either
ignore the name . . . or know the location well enough to brush aside the idea
that such production facilities would be found there." Franqois Dessemontet, Protec-
tion of Geographical Denominations Under Swiss Law, in PROTECTION OF GEO-
GRAPHIC DENOMINATIONS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 97, 119 (Herman Cohen
Jehoram ed. 1980).
82. See Lee Bendekgey & Caroline H. Mean, International Protection of Appel-
lations of Origin and Other Geographic Indications, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 765, 781-
83 (1992). This definition of "misleading" did not prevail in the TRIPS negotia-
tions. Id. NAFTA negotiators looked to the definitions used in TRIPS, which pre-
dated NAFTA by five years, and in some cases directly imported the language. See
Daniel R. Bereskin, A Comparison of the Trademark Provisions of NAFTA and
TRIPS, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 11 (1993).
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should not be passed over lightly. It is entirely reasonable to
interpret the provision as being tied to public perception, as
demonstrated by consumer conduct in the marketplace. If the
NAFTA parties wanted a specific definition, or legal test, for
"misleading" to be imposed on member counties they could
have included it in the treaty. Instead, they left it up to the
members to interpret it in a way that works best in their legal
systems.
The pre-NAFTA interpretation of "misleading" allows a
wide array of geographical terms to be protected without injur-
ing anyone. Such an approach prevents owners from being
denied intellectual property protection due to benign and in-
substantial types of misinformation. Since a goods/place associ-
ation does not mean that the geographic place be "noted for"
the goods at issue,83 it is quite possible that the consumer
does not care that the goods are geographically misdescriptive.
Where there is a faint goods/place association, the misdescrip-
tive quality of the mark borders on being suggestive or arbi-
trary, since at some level all arbitrary marks misdescribe their
goods. The legal line must be drawn through this gray area,
and proprietary rights should prevail up to the point where
there is a realistic potential for consumers to be wronged. In-
stead, the Committee's assessment denied the mark owner
federal trademark protection based on harmless distortions
which do not influence the consumer's decision to purchase.
Deciding that misdescriptive marks are misleading also
casts doubts on many common law trademark rights. Federal
registration is not the only way to have rights in a mark; busi-
nesses can acquire rights in a mark through use in commerce.
For example, although they were denied federal registration,
the owners of TEXAS STEAKHOUSE & SALOON likely will
continue using the name, and would ordinarily have both a
state and federal cause of action against somebody who tried to
put up a similar restaurant next door using the same name.
But what happens if the competition learns of the misdescrip-
tive quality, and attempts to enjoin TEXAS STEAKHOUSE &
SALOON from using their name under section 1125 of the
Lanham Act, which allows private suit for "any false indication
83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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of origin" that is deceptive?" Now that geographically decep-
tively misdescriptive marks are treated just like deceptive
marks, they would appear to have a strong argument. Con-
gress granted "grandfather" protection to misdescriptive marks
that became distinctive before December 8, 1993,85 but many
small businesses have continued to adopt and invest in these
marks. Surely there are many pizza restaurants that have
utilized some form of the mark NEW YORK since 1993, or
Cajun restaurants that have adopted NEW ORLEANS without
getting trademark advice from council. Unless these businesses
have a legitimate connection to these cities, their names are
now exposed to risk for being deceptive under the Lanham Act,
even though their customers do not care that the name is
somewhat inaccurate. Perhaps many judges would find an
equitable way to avoid such a harsh result. But what about
banks considering a loan based on collateralizing the
restaurant's goodwill,86 or a potential buyer assessing his tar-
get acquisition? The ethereal benefits of having perfectly forth-
right information embodied in every trademark may be out-
weighed by the very real burdens the law has put on owners of
misdescriptive marks. Of course, if after carefully weighing the
merits and the costs of the deceptively misdescriptive clause,
Congress decided it was better public policy to amend the
Lanham Act, it clearly has the power to do so. But such an
analysis was not made. The Act was amended because it was
misunderstood.
B. The GATTI TRIPs Agreement.
On December 15, 1993, during the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations to amend their intellectual
property laws, the 130 member countries of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to comport with the language of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
85. See id. § 1052(f).
86. See Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial
Transactions, 10 SPG ENT. & SPORTS L. 5, 6 (1992). "Intellectual property may be
a borrower's most valuable asset .... As such, it constitutes a viable source of
collateral for pledge to a lender, which upon the borrower's default, may be seized,
owned, and sold by the lender to repay the loan." Id. The author goes on to de-
scribe how trademarks are collateralized without losing the goodwill. Id. at 7.
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erty Rights treaty (TRIPS)." The treaty addresses a variety of
intellectual property concerns and represents a compromise
between industrialized and developing nations over the scope
of protection afforded to intellectual property and the terms of
implementation."
The treaty implicitly distinguishes between trademarks
that employ geographical trademarks and "geographical indica-
tions" which the TRIPS negotiators sought to protect.89 The
distinction between the two concepts is that trademarks indi-
cate a single source of goods while geographical indications can
indicate multiple sources of goods, as long as they come from
the same geographical origin." This subtle distinction is re-
vealed in the TRIPS definition of its subject: "Geographical
indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement, indications
which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Mem-
ber, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essen-
tially attributable to its geographical origin."9 This definition
thus addresses indications that connote a region that the popu-
lation associates with the goods, as opposed to the singular
producer of the goods.9" The intensity of the association, and
the breadth of the terms "quality," "reputation," and "charac-
teristic," determine the contours of TRIPS' commands.
The TRIPS Agreement imposes a bifurcated system, which
employs one standard for wines and spirits, and another for all
other goods.9" Considering the alcoholic beverage articles first,
the treaty requires countries to adopt a per se rule against
inaccurate geographical indications on wines and spirits, re-
gardless of any association between the goods and the place.
The relevant language is as follows:
Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested
parties to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying
87. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
88. See J. H, Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction
to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANsNr'L L. 363, 369 (1996).
89. TRIPS, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 22(1).
92. See id.
93. Id. arts. 22, 23.
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wines for wines not originating in the place indicated by the
geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for
spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geograph-
ical indication in question even where the true origin of the
goods is indicated or the geographical indication is used in
translation or accompanied by expressions such as "kind,"
"type," "style," "imitation," or the like.94
This language represents the European, particularly
French, frustration95 with the United States' consumer orien-
tation, as demonstrated by the fact that there is no mention of
consumer perception. Results like that reached in Vinters,
(CHABLIS WITH A TWIST)96 should not occur under the
amended Lanham Act, which now denies protection to "geo-
graphical indications which, when used on or in connection
with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of
the goods."9" The amended language in the Lanham Act does
not impose a "misleading" or "confusion" requirement; there-
fore, consumer ignorance or indifference will not be a de-
fense." For example, in 1997 the TTAB denied registration
for the mark HAVANA STYLE for rum produced elsewhere,
explaining that the recent amendment to the Lanham Act "is
an absolute prohibition... if the wines and spirits do not
originate in that geographical area."99 This bright-line rule
94. Id. at art. 23(1) (emphasis added).
95. See Paul J. Heald, Impact of the TRIPS Agreement on Specific Disciplines:
Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNATI L. 635 (1996). "The French have worked for
almost 100 years to attain unassailable protection for terms like 'champagne' and
'chablis'" Id. at 647. But it is not just the French beverage industries that have
pressed for protection of regional designation. The U.S. Ambassador to France and
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed on behalf of their governments to
protect BOURBON as a geographical indication in France in exchange for similar
treatment for the term CALVADOS in the United States. Id. at 645 (citing 2
STEPHAN LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTs: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 681 at 1253-54 (1975)). It is unclear how much influ-
ence the American Ambassador could have over a tribunal's decision whether the
term CALVADOS was a geographical term or not.
96. The Institut National Des Appellations D'Origine v. Vinters International
Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 1574 (1992).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994). The statute provides "grandfather" clause pro-
tection to goods first used in connection with wines on or after one year after the
date the WTO Agreement enters force, or January 1, 1996. Id.
98. Id.
99. In re Bacardi & Co., 1997 T.T.B. LEXIS 169 at *7 (1997). The TTAB
pointed out that the mark was not denied registration under the new GATT driv-
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may, at first blush, appear to be consistent with the interest in
preventing the palming off of goodwill. But, palming off in this
type of situation does not convert the goodwill of a company,
rather it refers to the goodwill of a region. In this sense, the
rule protects an entire regional industry, not a particular pro-
ducer. When certain wineries within a region provide a superi-
or product, the goodwill created by this effort is protected re-
gardless of whether the name of the region is used by others in
a distant place. After all, the name of a winery presumably can
be trademarked. Keep in mind that the TRIPS provision pro-
hibits any misdescriptive mark even if the actual name of the
region is clearly labeled, and the misdescriptive mark is used
in conjunction with the term "type" or "style." Under these
circumstances, the argument that this provision seeks to com-
bat deception is a pretext, and the European insistence on
strict rules for geographical indications appears to be motivat-
ed by an interest in monopolizing familiar marketing terms.
Regarding the use of geographical indications for goods
that are not wines or spirits, the agreement denies protection
to geographical marks that are misleading to the public. The
relevant language is as follows:
2. In respect of geographical indications, Members shall pro-
vide the legal means for interested parties to prevent:
[tihe use of any means in the designation or presenta-
tion of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in
question originates in a geographical area other than
the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the
public as to the geographical origin of the good.. . "
Because the term "misleading" was the operative term in
the NAFTA agreement, Congress has not modified the Lanham
Act to incorporate this article. This response is correct because
the article only applies to "territories where a given quality,
reputation, or other characteristic is attributable to the re-
en amendments to Section 2(a) because the applicant filed an intent to use regis-
tration before the effective date. Id. at *8 n.7. However, the tribunal noted that if
there was no actual use before the date, the absolute bar .will apply. Id. In an
earlier proceeding, the TTAB denied registration for HAVANA SELECT, HABANA
CLASICO, OLD HAVANA, and HAVANA CLIPPER for rum. In re Bacardi &
Company 1997 T.T.A.B. LEXIS at 16, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031 (1997).
100. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 22, para. (2) (emphasis added).
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gion." Thus, a stronger association is required to trigger the
TRIPS prohibition than is required under the Lanham Act. As
mentioned above, the Lanham Act's requirement of a
goods/place association does not demand that the area be "not-
ed for" the good at issue. °1
The problem with the TRIPS language is that it can be,
and has been, interpreted to prohibit much more than what
the negotiators had in mind. Much like the United States Con-
gress did in response to the NAFTA treaty, there may be a
tendency to overreact. This can happen in at least two differ-
ent ways. One way is to give the term "misleading" a hypersen-
sitive interpretation, such as denying misdescriptive geograph-
ical marks protection where there is a faint goods/place asso-
ciation. This approach essentially operates as a requirement
that the geographical term be indisputably arbitrary in order
to be registered, like the ALASKA BANANA example used in
In re Nantucket."2 Nothing in the drafting history gives con-
clusive guidance to the proper application of this term.
Another way the TRIPS agreement can be misapplied is
through interpreting the definition of "geographical indica-
tions" in such broad terms that marks with virtually any geo-
graphical connotation will be rejected if the goods it represents
do not originate in the suggested place. Indeed, Congress did
not import any of the TRIPS restrictive language in its defini-
tion of geographical indications, apparently relying on
judiciary's goods/place requirement to perform this function.
However, for legal systems which do import the language ver-
batim, the term "characteristic" is particularly open-ended, and
could be "essentially attributable" to virtually any area if inter-
preted liberally. This is especially true for countries that have
not developed an equivalent to the goods/place association, as
would be expected from jurisdictions that do not base their
trademark law on a consumer-oriented model.' 3
In his article, Trademarks and Geographical Indications:
Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, Professor
Heald concludes that U.S. businesses and consumers should be
pleased with the TRIPS agreement. 4 For the majority of
101. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
102. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
103. See Heald, supra note 95.
104. See id. at 654.
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those affected by the treaty this is probably true. But those
companies involved in marketing products with geographically
misdescriptive marks will not be applauding, and the consum-
ers of their products may pay more as companies that struggle
to redefine the market pass those costs along. Yet, it is unlike-
ly that the negotiators at TRIPS meant the agreement to im-
pose this severe limitation on trademark rights for goods which
are not wines and spirits. First, there would be no need to
separate wines and spirits from other products if they were all
to be treated the same way. Second, if the negotiators wanted
to impose such a bright line requirement, they simply could
have required that goods with geographical indications must
originate from the suggested place. They did not do so.
To prevent further misunderstanding, the TRIPS treaty
should be amended to include some form of codification pro-
claiming that marks that do not mislead are still protected.
The provision must not apply to wines and spirits because the
clear terms of that provision deny protection to misdescriptive
marks regardless of consumer perception. This language was
the result of informed bargaining and should not be altered by
an amendment that seeks only to clarify the agreement. The
author recommends the following language: "nothing in article
22 prevents Members from affording legal protection to trade-
marks which suggest a geographic place that is not their true
place of origin, if it is not likely to influence the public's deci-
sion to purchase the goods." Although this addition may seem
repetitive and obvious to those familiar with the goods/place
association doctrine, such an amendment will focus the atten-
tion of lawmakers around the globe-and judges where the
treaty language is imported directly into a domestic statute or
deemed to be self-executing-on the narrow requirements of
the Agreement, and thus prevent the excessive abrogation of
the field of protectable trademarks. Alerting lawmakers to the
proper scope of the treaty might have the additional effect of
prompting them to think more carefully about what their laws
actually protect and prohibit. This is likely to be politically
feasible since the European wine and spirit industry is already
safeguarded from misdescriptive marks, and therefore should
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not fear a more narrow interpretation of the other provi-
sions."5
IV. IMPACT ON OTHER WTO MEMBERS' TRADEMARK LAw
A brief overview of recent changes in TRIPS signatories'
trademark law reveals a trend towards constricting the allow-
able field of geographical trademarks. Commentators on intel-
lectual property treaties have remarked on how countries
around the globe have been rushing to implement new legisla-
tion on numerous issues, often without closely ascertaining
what the new treaty requires.' 6 Some have gone so far as to
adopt complicated "appellation of origin" type registration
systems far beyond what TRIPS requires, others simply have
revised their laws in ways which potentially threaten misde-
scriptive geographical marks in the future.0 7 Many signatory
countries have yet to respond to the TRIPS Agreement. Thus
amending the TRIPS language may prevent further erosion,
especially where the direct language of the treaty is used in a
court without a goods/place doctrine to limit its potentially
overbroad application.
In considering the amendments made by various nations,
it should be remembered that it is difficult to be certain that
the changes in the law were directly compelled by a perceived
obligation to the treaty. Some legislatures may have used the
opportunity to revise their laws in a more general sense, or
they may have been bound by other treaty obligations, which
have different requirements.' 8 However, the direct traces of
the TRIPS language along with the timing of the enacted legis-
lation strongly implicate a reaction to the Agreement.
Because time and space prevent a comprehensive, in-depth
assessment of TRIPS' influence on various member states'
legislation in this comment, a close look at Brazil's recent
amendments will serve as an example. Brazil joined the WTO
105. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 23.
106. See Clark W. Lackart, Geographical Indications: What Does the WTO
TRIPS Agreement Require?, TRADEMARK WORK, Aug. 1998, at 30. "We should pro-
ceed cautiously to address protection of geographical indications, since countries
must ensure that valuable trademark rights are not sacrificed in a thoughtless
rush to implement WTO/TRIPS Agreement Articles 22, 23, and 24." Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally Global Trademark and Copyright, supra note 59.
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Convention in 1967, and recently enacted a new "Industrial
Property Law," which became effective on May 15, 1997.09
Regarding geographical marks, the new law creates three cate-
gories. The first category is an "indication of source," which is
defined as the "geographical name of a country, city, region or
locality of its territory, which has become known as a center of
extraction, production, or manufacture of a determined product
or for providing a determined service."" ° The second is an ap-
pellation of origin, and is defined as a geographical name
which "designates a product or service, the qualities or charac-
teristics of which are exclusively or essentially due to the geo-
graphical environment, including natural and human fac-
tors.""' The use of marks in both these categories are re-
stricted to the producers and providers of services "established
in the locality.""' The restrictions put on these two catego-
ries are consistent with the scope of legislation required by
TRIPS, because misdescription likely would mislead consumers
due to the strong association between the goods and the
place."' But Brazil chose to legislate further: "A geographical
name that does not constitute an indication of source or an
appellation of origin may serve as a characteristic element of a
product or service mark, provided it does not suggest a false
source.""' This is just the type of open-ended legislation that
threatens harmless misdescriptive marks. There is no explicit
protection given to geographical marks which are not primarily
geographic or which are used in an arbitrary manner. Nor is
there any requirement that there be a goods/place type of asso-
ciation for a mark to be found to be falsely suggestive. In fact,
because the first two categories already provide for situations
where there are strong associations, the courts may, through
negative implication, reason that no such requirement is need-
ed when assessing marks in this final category. A judicially
imposed goods/place association is unlikely in a civil law coun-
try like Brazil.
109. Id. Among the changes to Brazil's laws were the recognition of certifica-
tion marks and collective marks, and the abolishment of protection for "Notorious"
and "Generic/House" marks. See id. at Brazil 25, Vol. 1 (1997).
110. Decreto No. 9279 of May 14, 1996, Title IV, art. 177.
111. Id. art. 178.
112. Id. art. 182.
113. TRIPS, supra note 87, art 22.
114. Decreto No. 9279 of May 14, 1996, Title IV, art. 181.
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V. CONCLUSION
The effort to harmonize the trademark laws around the
world has had much success in the last decade. Both NAFTA
and GATT/TRIPS have improved the effectiveness of enforcing
of trademark rights, and thus have made international com-
merce a less risky endeavor for most businesses. However,
these advances have come with a cost, borne by a yet to be
heard from class of producers and suppliers who market goods
using geographically misdescriptive trademarks. These busi-
nesses will face a legal climate that is increasingly hostile to
their trademarks, even when their misdescriptive qualities are
of little concern to the purchasers of their products. Many of
these companies will have developed goodwill internationally
through the Internet,"5 yet they will be unable to fully pro-
tect it. The uncertainty that has been cast by TRIPS language
is apt to make banks balk at collateralizing the value of these
trademarks," 6 and potential buyers of such companies also
will be hesitant when valuing their targets. The shift away
from a consumer perception model adds to the irony of this
contemporary hypersensitivity towards geographically "mis-
leading" marks. By rejecting all misdescriptive geographical
terms on wines and spirits-even where the actual origin of
the product is clearly marked for the consumer's benefit-the
TRIPS negotiators actually ignored consumers at the very time
they purported to protect them.
If these costs were the result of an effective drive to rid
the marketplace of deceptive marketing, they would be easier
to accept. Instead, these losses are a result of imprecise treaty
drafting and impatient legislation. For example, the United
States overreacted in 1993 when it amended the Lanham Act
to deny protection to misdescriptive marks that were not relied
upon by the consumer when purchasing. Now countries all
over the globe are overreacting to the GATT/TRIPS language
in a similar manner. The language of the GATT/TRIPS agree-
ment is clear enough to those accustomed to the goods/place
requirement found in trademark systems that focus on the
consumer's perceptions. But since the treaty bound most of the
industrialized nations of the world, such a provincial assump-
115. See id.
116. See Simensky, supra note 86.
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tion was unwarranted. The treaty should have included lan-
guage that made the narrow scope of its command clear to all
signatory states.
In response to these problems, the author suggests two
solutions. Domestically, the judiciary should adopt the higher
"noted for" standard for finding a goods/place association. If a
product utilizes a geographical mark which connotes a place
that is noted for the good it is used upon, tle consumer most
likely will consider this fact when purchasing. This is not a
perfect fix, but it should increase the likelihood that benign
misdescriptive marks will be protected. Because it is easier to
determine whether a place is "noted for" particular goods than
whether one merely subjectively associates the place with the
goods, this change will add some much-needed predictability in
this area of the law. As telecommunications bring the commer-
cial world together, virtually anything could be associated with
a particular place, leaving only the most obviously arbitrary or
impossible combinations free from doubt. Under this more
intuitive "noted for" approach, business people will have a
stronger sense of when they are crossing the line into illegal
marks, since the potential for real deception is more obvious.
Secondly, to prevent the rest of the TRIPS signatory coun-
tries from adopting burdensome legislation, the operative lan-
guage should be amended to include the following provision:
"nothing in article 22 prevents Members from affording legal
protection to trademarks which suggest a geographic place that
is not their true place of origin, if it is not likely to influence
the public's decision to purchase the goods." This language will
highlight the limits of the agreement. This amendment will not
prevent those states that wish to stamp out victimless decep-
tion at an unforeseeable cost to future business endeavors, but
it will make clear that the TRIPS agreement does not compel
them to do so.
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